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Note: SEC Rule 146-The Private Placement Exemption
On April 23, 1974, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) formally announced the adoption of Rule 146 under the
Securities Act of 1933, the Rule to become effective June 10,
1974.1 Section 5 of the 1933 Act prohibits the use of interstate
commerce or the mail for the sale of securities unless the issuer
has filed an effective registration statement with the SEC.* An
exception to this registration requirement is provided in section
4(2), which exempts sales by an issuer that do not involve a
public offering. Rule 146 governs transactions based on section
4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 3-the private placement
exemption.
The registration of securities pursuant to the 1933 Act can
be a painstaking and expensive process and also precludes cer-
tain economic benefits to be derived from sales outside of the
process.4 Consequently, the private placement exemption has
been used to sell a substantial amount of securities since 1933.5
Because section 4 (2) does not define exactly what kind of trans-
action constitutes a private offering, there have been numerous
administrative and judicial interpretations of the concept. As
a result of the confusion generated by these interpretations, the
Commission came to the conclusion that a more objective set
of standards ought to be promulgated." In November of 1972,
the SEC published its first proposed Rule 146, the stated purpose
of which was to provide a "safe harbour" for issuers seeking
1. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5487 (April 23, 1974), 39 Fed.
Reg. 15261 (1974). The Rule will appear as 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1974).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
4. Issuers are subject to a considerable amount of expense, delay
and unwanted public exposure as a result of registration under the 1933
Act. However, the issuer may also seek a private placement because
he is able to arrange more flexible terms with the offeree, obtain a
firm commitment and avoid the costs of underwriting. 1 L. Loss, SE-
cuxrrns REGuLATiON 691-96 (2d ed. 1961) (hereinafter cited as 1 Loss).
5. The exact figures are not available, but Commissioner Owens
estimated that the dollar volume of securities privately placed exceeded
that of those offered to the public through registration under the 1933
Act. Address by Hugh F. Owens, Commissioner, Securities and Ex-
change Commission, A Look at the Private Offering Exemption as it
Approaches its Fourteenth Birthday, 152 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP., G-1(May 17, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Owens].
6. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5336 (Nov. 28, 1972), 37
Fed. Reg. 26137 (1972).
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to accomplish a private placement. If an issuer complied with
all the conditions of this Rule, the transaction would be deemed
a private placement. As the proposal was to be non-exclusive,
private placement exemptions could also be achieved outside of
the Rule's "safe harbour."7
In connection with the publication, the Commission invited
comment concerning the proposed Rule. As a result of com-
ments from members of the securities bar, the Commission pub-
lished a revised proposed Rule 146 in October of 1973.8 Again,
a period of commentary ensued. Although the Rule as finally
issued reflects changes based upon the commentary of various
critics, certain basic principles have remained intact throughout
the development of the Rule.
This Note will examine the development of SEC Rule 146
as reflected in the provisions of each of the proposed Rules, dis-
cuss the Rule as finally issued, and present a portion of the
securities bar's opinion of the Rule as expressed by commentary
directed to the SEC. This analysis is intended to provide insight
into the "legislative" history of the Rule by showing which is-
sues and problems were brought to the attention of the Commis-
sion.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1933 ACT
The Congressional purpose in enacting the 1933 Act was to
protect the public by providing a continuous system of disclo-
sures concerning securities offered for saleY The Act's drafters
modeled it upon the English Companies Act, which was based
essentially on registration and disclosure.' 0 This approach dif-
fers from that of state "blue sky" laws in that the latter focus
on evaluating the soundness of each particular issue."1 Congress
believed -that the disclosure of significant facts about an issuer
would be a sufficient protection for the public while providing
an efficient system of raising investment capital.12
The 1933 Act thus requires the issuer to submit to the SEC
a registration statement which contains significant information
7. Id.
8. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5430 (Oct. 10, 1973), 38 Fed.
Reg. 28951 (1973).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1970).
10. See 1 Loss, supra note 4. See also, Landis, The Legislative
History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 29 (1959).
11. See 1 Loss, supra note 4, at 30-106.
12. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1933).
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about the issuer.'3 Once this statement has been filed, the issuer
may make offers to sell the security.' 4 However, no sale may
-be consummated until the SEC has actually approved the regis-
tration statement.15 When the statement is made available to
the public, written offers of the security must be accompanied
by a prospectus which contains information similar -to that on
file with the Commission. A prospectus must also be distributed
to the purchaser when a sale is made.' 0
The 1933 Act also contains sanctions to make the registration
and disclosure requirements effective. Both the issuer and the
underwriters are responsible for statements made in the regis-
tration statement and prospectus. Issuers and underwriters are
likewise held liable for false and misleading statements concern-
ing the issue. There are also sanctions against the sale of a
security in the absence of registration when no exemption is
available. In addition, -purchasers may seek rescission under sec-
tion 12(1) of the Act when securities are sold in violation of
the statute.' 7
In enacting the 1933 Act, Congress recognized that in some
instances, registration is unnecessary; the scope of the registra-
tion requirement is therefore limited to public offerings of se-
curities. The House report of the bill emphasized that "[the act]
carefully exempts from its application certain types of ... se-
curities transactions where there is no practical need for its ap-
plication or where the public benefits are too remote."' 8  One
of the drafters of the statute recalls that "[t] he sale of an is-
sue of securities to insurance companies or to a limited group
of experienced investors, was certainly not a matter of concern
to the federal government."' 9  To provide for those instances
in which the requirement of a registration statement would pro-
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, g (1970).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1970).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1970).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1970).
17. Sanctions in the statute are found in the following sections:
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970) imposes civil damages for untrue or misleading
statements in the registration statement; 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970) allows
for rescission of transactions that are in violation of section 5 or which
contain misleading or false information; 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970) imposes
criminal penalties for fraudulant transactions; 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1970)
provides for the issuance of injunctions against transactions which vio-
late'the terms of the statute; dealers and brokers may also be subject
to disciplinary suspension for violation of the 1933 Act by virtue of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78(o) (1970).
18. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
19. See Landis, supra note 10, at 31.
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duce unneeded protection for the investing public, Congress
drafted section 4(2) exempting transactions not involving "any
person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." 20  Sec-
tion 2(11) of the 1933 Act defines an underwriter as someone
who acquires stock "with a view to . . . distribution."'2' One
who acquires stock with the idea of later selling it is considered
to be acquiring the stock with a view to distribution, and one who
acquires stock as part of the distribution process is by definition
engaging in a public offering.22 Therefore, the private offering
exemption requires that the stock not be subsequently intro-
duced into the stream of commerce.
II. EARLY ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
As noted above, section 4(2) exempts from the registration
requirement those "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering." The Commission first attempted to interpret
this statutory language by defining the elements of a private
offering in a 1935 SEC Release.23 Prior to 1935, administrative
folklore had suggested that an offering to an insubstantial num-
ber of persons-25 or fewer-would qualify as a private place-
ment. In its Release, the Commission took note of .this view,
but stated that numbers alone were not controlling, indicating
that the facts of each transaction must be examined to deter-
mine whether a private placement had been effected. "4  The
Commission then listed four factors which were to be considered
in characterizing a private placement. The first factor involved
the number of offerees, their relationship to each other, and
their relationship to the offeror. The Commission emphasized
that the number of persons to whom a security was offered was
significant, rather than the number of persons who ultimately
purchased the security. The Commission also stated -that the
word "offering," for this purpose, should include preliminary ne-
gotiations. 25 With respect to the relationship of offerees to each
20. Act of May 27, 1933, tit. I, § 4(1), 48 Stat. 77. While appearing
originally as § 4(1) this section was renumbered by the Securities Act
Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 12, 78 Stat. 565, 580, and
is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970).
22. See 1 Loss, supra note 4.
23. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
24. The release did not specifically rebut the idea that 25 was the
key number, but it did imply that this was one of the things to be
taken into account.
25. The Commission was obviously forced to retreat from this posi-
tion when Congress amended the 1933 Act to exclude preliminary nego-
tiations from the definition of offer. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1970).
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other, an offer to the general public rather than to a particular
group or class was more likely to involve a public offering.-2 0
The Commission also discussed the relationship between issuer
and offeree, perhaps the most significant element in light of
later developments. Persons with "special knowledge" of the
issuer such as "high executive employees" were cited as ex-
amples of offerees to whom a private offering would be appro-
priate.2 7
The second factor was the number of units sold. The Com-
mission reasoned that the fewer the number of units sold, the
less likely that they would pass into the hands of the general
public. The third factor was the size of the offering. It was
thought that the size of an offering was an indication as to
whether the issue might later be distributed in a public offering
by the issuer.2s The fourth factor was the manner of the of-
fering. The Commission emphasized that "direct negotiations"
between issuer and offeree were indicative of a private place-
ment.
2 9
These four factors have been frequently cited by courts
dealing with -the private placement exemption.30 The definitive
analysis of the exemption, however, was offered by the United
States Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co. 3 ' This case
involved an offering by a company to a large group of "key"
employees. The company selected as an offeree any employee
who was "an individual who is eligible for promotion, . . . who
is sympathetic to management ... and who is ambitious
.... ,2 In discussing whether the private placement exemption
should be available to the company, the Court examined the
purpose of the registration required by the 1933 Act 33 Inas-
much as the goal of the Act was to provide "full disclosure,"
26. The courts and the SEC have continued to take this factor into
account. See, e.g., Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959);
Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
27. The Supreme Court alluded to these characteristics specifically
in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
28. But see S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND RESTRICTED SE-
cowuixs 2.2 (1973) for the proposition that these two factors are not
good predictors as to the validity of a private offering.
29. The courts and the Commission frown upon advertising and
the use of professional sales agents to sell the securities. Value Line
Fund Inc. v. Marcus, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. March
31, 1965); Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
30. E.g., SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1972).
31. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
32. Id. at 122.
33. Id. at 122-23.
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the Court determined that -the protection of the Act was not
intended to extend to persons who could "fend for themselves"
without such disclosure.8 4 Thus the availability of the exemp-
tion turned upon whether the offerees had "access to the kind
of information which registration would disclose. '85  As an ex-
ample of such offerees, the Court cited "executive personnel who
because of their position have access to the same kind of in-
formation that the Act would make available in the form of
a registration statement."36  Pointing out that the size of the
offering was irrelevant as long as the knowledge requirements
were met,8 7 the Court held that in this case the issuer had not
met the aforementioned standard.
After Ralston Purina, federal courts considered a number
of cases dealing with -the private offering exemption. Most
courts formally adopted the access to information test as set
forth by the Supreme Court, explicitly rejecting reliance on the
number of offerees as a critical factor.38 Other courts cited Ral-
ston Purina, but continued to employ the four factors set forth
by the Commission in 1935.89 Even the opinions which relied
on Ralston Purina, however, interpreted different phrases from
the opinion as being of critical importance. 40 Some courts fo-
cused on the words "fend for themselves," emphasizing the in-
vestment experience of the offerees, 4' others emphasized the in-
formation actually made available to the offerees, 42 while others
discussed the offerees in terms of their ability to elicit relevant
information from the issuer.48
Notwithstanding this confusion as to the specific standard
to be applied, all courts agreed that the burden was upon the
34. Id. at 125.
35. Id. at 127.
36. Id. at 125.
37. Id.
38. E.g., Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959).
39. Knapp v. Kinsey, 249 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1959); Vicioso v. Wat-
son, 325 F. Supp. 1071 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
40. See generally, Note, Reforming the Initial Sale Requirements
of the Private Placement Exemption, 86 HARV. L. REv. 403, 406-09 (1972).
41. Lively v. Hirschfield, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971); Garfield
v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1963); Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp.
898 (D. Colo. 1959).
42. See SEC v. Tax Service, Inc., 357 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1966); Gil-
ligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959).
43. United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC,
267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Supp. 1021
(D. Conn. 1969).
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issuer to establish the elements of the private placement exemp-
tion . 44  Because of this burden and the fact patterns present
in many cases, much of the language which appears in these
cases can be classified as dicta. 45 Generally, however, the cases
in which courts held against the issuer involved large issues,
a substantial number of offerees, and offerees who had not been
provided with adequate information about the issuer.46
A final necessary element in private placements, one not
alluded to in Ralston Purina, was the requirement that the of-
ferees, in addition to meeting the access to information test,
purchase the securities with an appropriate investment intent.
In order to dispel the specter of a distribution and to establish
investment intent, certain instruments became used as a matter
of convention. For example, issuers placed a legend on the stock
indicating that its circulation was restricted; stop-transfer in-
structions were then given to transfer agents with reference to
this restriction. More often, however, issuers simply obtained an
investment letter from purchasers. This document, signed by the
purchaser, indicated that he was purchasing the security with the
sole intent of holding it for a period of time as an investment.4T
As a practical matter, however, these letters were regarded as
mere formalities by all parties involved.48
The decision in SEC v. Cromwell-Collier Publishing CoY'
cast doubt on the effectiveness of these devices. Cromwell in-
volved a disciplinary action against a brokerage firm that had
sold securities in a private placement, obtaining letters of invest-
ment intent. Because the securities were soon circulating in the
stream of commerce, the Commission, as well as the Second Cir-
cuit, took a dim view of the issuer's reliance on investment let-
ters.50 The effect of the Cromwell holding was to require is-
suers to go beyond the formalities of an investmefit letter in
establishing substantial investment intent.
44. E.g.,. Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898 (D. Colo. 1959). This
is also part of the holding in Ralston Purina.
45. Comment letter to SEC from Carl Schneider and Charles Zall,
228 SEc. L. REP. F-1 (Nov. 21, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Schneider and
Zall].
46. Id.
47. See S. GOLDBERG, supra note 28, at §§ 2.5-2.6.
48. Id. at § 2.5 (d).
49. Cromwell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release
No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957).
50. See Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959).
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III. LATER INTERPRETATIONS AND USE OF
THE EXEMPTION
In a 1962 SEC Release, the Commission sought to clarify
the private placement concepts developed after Ralston Purina."
It reaffirmed the approach suggested in its 1935 Release, empha-
sizing the facts surrounding each transaction with respect to the
"nature, scope, size, type and manner of the offering. '5 2 The
Commission placed special emphasis on the offerees' access to rel-
evant facts concerning an offering; information voluntarily sub-
mitted by -the issuer was considered insufficient to meet this as-
pect of the knowledge requirement. 5 3
Despite the restrictive judicial and administrative inter-
pretations given section 4(2), the private placement remained
a viable exemption. Institutional investors, such as insurance
companies, continued to purchase securities under the exemption,
thus accounting for a large segment of securities sold privately. "
Institutional investors are unique, however, in that they usually
meet the requirement that the private placement offeree pur-
chase with a genuine investment intent. Whereas a private in-
dividual might be tempted to sell, the institutional investor nor-
mally has the resources required to retain the investment and
therefore rarely disposes of a security acquired in a private
placement. Moreover, institutional investors are sophisticated,
are usually able to fend for themselves, and possess enough eco-
nomic power to gain access to relevant investment information.55
Private placement sales also continued to be made in a va-
riety of non-institutional situations. First, private individuals
were often the source of venture capital, used to get a newly or-
ganized entity on its feet, or at least to defray costs until the
registration process could be completed. Normally, these financ-
ing arrangements involved smaller amounts of money than did
institutional investments. 56 Second, private placement financ-
ing involved sales of stock to employees, often by smaller cor-
porations prior to going public. 57 Finally, issuers attempted to
51. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed.
Reg. 11316 (1962).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Richardson, The Private Placement Method of Financing,
45 CH. B. REC. 328 (1964).
55. Id. at 331.
56. H. BLOOMENTHAL & S. WING, SEcun'=s LAW 4-65, 4-66 (1973).
57. R. MUNDHEIM, A. FLEISCHER, & J. SCHUPPER, FOURTH ANNUAL IN-
STITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as MUND-
HEIM].
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use the private placement exemption for exchanges of stock in
connection with corporate acquisitions, the acquiring corporation
exchanging its newly issued stock for stock held by individual
shareholders of the acquired corporation.""
The case of SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co.,59 however, led
some commentators to question the continued viability of the
private placement exemption, even with regard to institutional
investors.60 Continental Tobacco involved the marketing of se-
curities of a company that manufactured a new type of low tar
and nicotine cigarette. The offering of the securities included
presentations using high pressure sales techniques and dramatic
filmstrips. The offerees were a diverse group of people, not all
of whom could be characterized as sophisticated investors, se-
lected from the general public in a casual manner!" On appeal
from the denial of an injunction sought by the SEC, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and granted the injunction,
stimulating fears that the private placement exemption was to
be severely circumscribed. 62 In addition to discussing the Ral-
ston Purina, opinion, the court noted that the four factors which
the SEC had established in 1935 as being relevant to the valid-
ity of a private placement had been relied upon in judicial opin-
ions on a regular basis. The court concluded that, therefore, the
ultimate test was whether the offerees "had a relationship with
Continental giving access to the kind of information that regis-
tration would have disclosed."6 3  In particular, the court re-
ferred to a previous Fifth Circuit opinion, Hill York Corp. v.
American International Franchises, Inc., where the following
language was contained in a footnote:
[The exemption is available] where the number of offerees is
so limited that they may constitute a class of persons having
such a privileged relationship with the issuer that their present
knowledge and facilities for acquiring information about the
issuer would make registration unnecessary for their protection.
.. 64
58. -Id. at 22.
59. 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
60. See The Disappearing Private Offering Exemption?, 144 BNA
SEc. RE.G. &LAw REP. B-1 (March 22, 1972).
61. One of the offerees was a dentist who in turn distributed offer-
ing brochures in his waiting room. MuNDHEM, supra note 57, at 50.
62. Id. at 57.
63. 436 F.2d af 158 (emphasis added).
64. 448 F.2d 660, 668 n.6 (5th Cir. 1971). See Orrick, Non-Public
Offerings of Corporate Securities-Limitations on the Exemption Under
the Federal Securities Act, 21 U. Prrr. L. Rsv. 1, 6-10 (1959), recognizing
that the knowledge requirement could be met by voluntary presentation
of information to the offeree; the quoted language about position and
access relates only to cases where this is not feasible.
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In Continental Tobacco, the offerees had been issued a brochure
about the company accompanied by the company's unaudited fi-
nancial statement. However, the court held the information in-
sufficient because there was no relationship between the offerees
and the issuer that could have provided access to further infor-
mation.
The court's language in Continental Tobacco may be viewed
as dicta because the facts involved clearly favored the issuance
of the injunction. The high pressure salesmanship together with
the inadequacy of the information provided by the issuer could
easily have been the basis for the finding of a public offering
without reference to the need for a "special relationship" be-
tween the offerees and the issuer. What proved most disquiet-
ing to the securities bar, however, was the fact that the court's
opinion appeared to rely heavily on the brief prepared by the
Commission staff.6 5 The Commission's brief argued the position
that the relationship of the offeree to the issuer should be essen-
tially that of an "insider"66-one who occupied a privileged
status vis-a-vis the offeror. In support of this position, the Com-
mission observed that both the offeror's attempt to provide reg-
istration type documents to the offeree and the fact that the
offeree was represented by legal counsel actually weighed
against the offeror because they more clearly indicated that the
offeree did not possess the requisite "insider" status.07 If the
SEC were to adhere to this "insider" standard, it would bring
into quesion the validity of a private offering to even sophisti-
cated institutional investors. Although enjoying the economic
power to demand significant information from the issuer, such
investors would not enjoy the close, day-to-day relationship with
the issuer that a corporate insider would. One commentator
speculated that a rigorous application of this standard would
invalidate 99 percent of all private placements. 8
In response to the furor that Continental Tobacco evoked,
SEC Commissioner Owens attempted to lessen the securities
bar's anxiety over the new "insider" standard.09 In May of 1972
he addressed a meeting of the National Association of Securities
Dealers and made the following observations:
65. See The Disappearing Private Offering Exemption?, 144 BNA
SEC. REG. & LAW REP. B-1, B-4 (March 22, 1972).
66. Id. at B-5.
67. Id. at B-6.
68. Id. at B-7.
69, Owens, supra note 5.
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Some commentators have suggested (and I believe there is
merit in their suggestions) that this language could be read to
mean that a permissible private placee must have a position with
the company similar to that of an insider in the lOb-5 sense.
If such an interpretation were to prevail, it could lead to such
a narrowing of the exemption that even an institutional investor
could not qualify. This is certainly not a conclusion I can sup-
port; in fact, I do not believe it was intended by the Com-
mission.70
Commissioner Owens then offered his interpretation of the
standards to be derived from the case:
(1) the offerees must be shown to have access to material infor-
mation- concerning the issuer and (2) the access criteria cannot
be met by merely providing, gratuitously, a promotional pro-
spectus purporting to afford instant access and by having each
offeree and purchaser sign a letter saying he has received and
read such document. 71
Commissioner Owens suggested that a more objective or "bright
line" standard be developed.
While the Commissioner's statements may have been reas-
suring, his position was merely that of a single member of the
Commission. Therefore, practitioners retained an uncertainty as
to the exact scope of the private placement exemption. As a
result of the uncertainty that then distinguished this area of
securities regulation, the Commission promulgated the first pro-
posd Rule 146 in 1972.72
IV. ANALYSIS OF RULE 146
The statement accompanying the proposed Rule 146 outlined
the Commission's basic goals. First, the offeree in a private
placement should have access to the same kind of information
that would be disclosed in a 1933 Act registration statement.
Second, the offeree, or a representative acting in his behalf,
should be capable of evaluating the risks of the investment and
making an informed decision. As an incident of such capability,
the offeree should .be able to bear the economic risk of the in-
vestment. Third, the manner of the offering should be consist-
ent with the concept of a non-public offering. Fourth, the al-
lowable number of purchasers should be small enough to limit
the issue's distribution.7
70. Id. at G-2.
71. Id.
72. First Proposed SEC Rule 146, 37 Fed. Reg. 26137 (1972).
73. Id., 37 Fed. eg.. at 26138. The Commission, noting the Rule
was experimental, welcomed comments relating to the Rule's effective-
ness in private placements.
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In what was to become a rather tortuous period of promul-
gation of the Rule, the Commission issued its first proposed Rule
in November of 1972 and invited comments from members of
the securities bar and other interested persons7 4 The response
to this invitation was a series of letters praising the general con-
cept of an objective test, but finding fault with the specific pro-
visions of the proposal. The following year, in October, 1973,
the Commission issued a second proposed Rule reflecting
changes based on some of the criticisms of the first proposal,
but retaining the basic concepts of the first proposed Rule.75
Finally, on April 23, 1974, the Commission issued Rule 146, to
become effective on June 10, 1974.76
A. APPLICATION AND SCOPE OF THE RULE
During the evolution of Rule 146, its general parameters
have not been greatly modified by the Commission. The Rule
is non-exclusive; thus the private placement exemption still
exists outside of its operation. As the Rule is to operate pro-
spectively only,77 no placements effected prior to its promulga-
tion come under its provisions. The Rule is applicable only to
issuers; all others must register issues or seek other exemptions.
Even though it may satisfy the requirements of the Rule, how-
ever, an issuer is still subject to the civil and anti-fraud provi-
sions of the 1933 Act as well as the obligations of state law. 78
The proposed scope and application of the Rule did generate
substantial adverse reaction on the part of commentators. With
regard to the proposed scope of the Rule, some commentators
were concerned that the conditions of the Rule might be used
as de facto standards in the application of the section 4(2)
exemption outside of the Rule.79  It was therefore suggested
74. Id., 37 Fed. Reg. at 26138.
75. Second Proposed SEC Rule 146, 38 Fed. Reg. 28951 (1973).
76. SEC Rule 146, 39 Fed. Reg. 15261 (1974).
77. Id., Operation, 39 Fed. Reg. at 15266. See also Second Proposed
SEC Rule 146, Operation, 38 Fed. Reg. 28951, 28956 (1973); First Proposed
SEC Rule 146, Operation, 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26139 (1972).
78. SEC Rule 146. 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15266 (1973).
79. Letter from Peter Platt, Donald Slichter, Norman Zilbur, Loyd
Dinkelspiel, Jr., Bruce Mann & David Nelson to Neal S. McCoy, Division
of Corporate Finance, SEC, February 7, 1973, p. 7 [hereinafter cited as
Platt, et al.]; Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell to Neal S. McCoy, Di-
vision of Corporate Finance, SEC, January 26, 1973, p. 2 [hereinafter
cited as Sullivan & Cromwell]; Letter from Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby,
Palmer & Wood to Neal S. McCoy, Division of Corporate Finance, SEC,
January 29, 1973, p. 11 [hereinafter cited as Dewey, et al.]; Letter from
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that the Rule contain an express statement to the effect that
its conditions would not become the exclusive guide for deter-
mining the validity of an exemption under section 4 (2).80
Some commentators also felt that the rule should be avail-
able to sellers other than issuers.81 Representatives of insurance
interests, for example, desired that the Rule be made available
to institutional investors making secondary distributions.82  In-
stitutional investors generally invest in large amounts of debt
securities, and occasionally need to sell blocks of these securities
for purposes of liquidity or to meet the demands of state law.
Although an outlet for such sales is provided by SEC Rule 144,83
the burdens imposed by that Rule render it an impractical al-
ternative. 84 Similarly, some observers suggested that the Rule
be made available to affiliates of the issuer. This would provide
-an outlet to holders of securities acquired in a business combina-
tion. In support of this application of the Rule, the burdens
of Rule 144 were again noted,8 5 and an analogy was drawn to
Rule 145,86 which has been broadened to include the issuance
of securities effected in reliance on section 4(2).
Despite the adverse reaction8" the Commission rejected sug-
gestions to expand the coverage of Rule 146. 88 Its position is
Robert Routier, American Life Insurance Association to Neal S. McCoy,
Division of Corporate Finance, SEC, January 29, 1973, p. 2 [hereinafter
cited as ALIA]. Letters on file in University of Minnesota Law Library.
It is nossible that previous experience with Commission practices in-
spired the fear that section 4(2) would be absorbed by the Rule.
80. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79; Dewey et al., supra note
79. Letter from Shearman & Sterling to Neal S. McCoy, Division of
Corporate Finance, SEC, January 29, 1973, p. 6 [hereinafter cited as
Shearman & Sterling]. Letters on file in University of Minnesota Law
Library.
81. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 4.
82. ALIA, supra note 79, at 2; Letter from John Pfarr, Aetna Life
and Casualty to Neal S. McCoy, Division of Corporate Finance, SEC,
January 26, 1973, pp. 1-2 [hereinafter cited as Aetna]. Letter on file
in University of Minnesota Law Library.
83. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1973). Promulgated under the 1933 Act,
this rule sets the standards for the determination of whether a seller
is engaged in a securities distribution.
84. ALIA, supra note 79, at 6 n.1; Shearman & Sterling, supra note
80, at 2. Because of the nature of the securities purchased and the usual
investment intent of institutional investors, moreover, public distribu-
tions are unlikely to occur. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 4.
85. Id.
86. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1973). The rule extends the registration
requirements of the 1933 Act to securities issued in the context of cer-
tain corporate reorganizations.
87. Aetna, supra note 82, at 1-2.
88. SEC Rule 146, General Description, 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15262
(1974).
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supportable in light of the potential and availability of Rule 144.
If the conditions of Rule 144 are difficult to meet, the difficulty
reflects Commission policy on the resale of restricted securities.
The provisions of Rule 146 were developed to deal with the in-
itial placement of securities; the Rule could not be expected to
adequately cover the dangers of public distribution in a resale
situation.
B. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF RULE 146
1. Conditions to be Met-146 (b)
Both the proposed and final versions of section (b) require
that all the conditions of Rule 146 be met in order that it apply.80
Thus, each section of the Rule represents a condition of its appli-
cation, and a failure to comply with any provision, regardless
of how insignificant, could take a transaction out of the exemp-
tion offered by the Rule.0 In the development of the Rule,
this basic concept changed very littleY1
Most commentators were critical of this concept, arguing
that an insignificant error by the issuer could result in a wind-
fall for a purchaser in a deal which had gone sour. Such an
error could also interfere with the investment plans of innocent
purchasers who had relied on the issuer's assurances that the
transaction qualified as a private placement.0 2 One observer
therefore proposed that where the failure to meet a particular
condition of the Rule was an innocent and immaterial error, the
exemption would be allowed. The issuer would be subject to
89. Section (a) of the Rule is devoted exclusively to the definition
of terms; these definitions will be discussed in connection with the ap-
plicable substantive provisions.
90. See SEC Rule 146, Preliminary Notes, 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15266
(1974); Second Proposed SEC Rule 146, Explanation and Analysis, 38
Fed. Reg. 28951, 28956-57 (1973); First Proposed SEC Rule 146, Prelim-
inary Notes, 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26138 (1972).
91. In reference to conditions to be met, the second proposed Rule
gave special emphasis to the word "all" by underlining it, but this un-
derlining was later dropped in the Rule as issued. The second proposed
Rule also added a reference to a preliminary note suggesting factors
in the determination of whether a series of transactions is to be inte-
grated for purposes of meeting the conditions of the Rule. Second Pro-
posed SEC Rule 146, Preliminary Note no. 3, 38 Fed. Reg. 28951, 28956-57
(1973).
Under the "safe harbour" provision in the Rule as issued, all sales
made within more than six months of a given transaction are not inte-
grated with that sale for the purposes of meeting the conditions of the
Rule. SEC Rule 146(b) (1), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15267 (1974).
92. Schneider & Zall, supra note 45, at F-2.
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some kind of sanction for failing to comply with the Rule, but
the sanction would be commensurate with the magnitude of the
error and would result in neither the rescission of the transac-
tion nor the loss of the exemption 3 Those commentators who
represented the purchaser's viewpoint suggested that purchasers
be protected by a provision which would assume that the issuer
had complied with all terms of the Rule. 4 Such a provision
would allow a transaction to stand with regard to purchases
even where the offering was otherwise defective. In other
words, the provision would effect a partial rescission. 5
Although the Commission rejected these suggestions, certain
changes that were made during the development of the Rule
served to mitigate the harshness of the section. One example
of such a change is the introduction of the "safe harbour" pro-
vision in the final version of the Rule. Another example is the
reference to "integration" in defining the scope of an offering;
this concept serves to establish some boundaries for application
of the Rule.96 Moreover, qualifying phrases have been inserted
throughout the Rule to allow some leeway in interpreting its
various requirements 7; frequent reference is also made to "rea-
sonableness" in defining the Rule's standard of compliance.98
Thus, the use of such phrases and the ambiguity of the conditions
themselves suggest that in practice the defense of an innocent
and immaterial error may be available to the issuer. However,
the Commission has not explicitly declared whether or not such
a defense will be recognized.
93. Id.
94. ALIA, supra note 79, at 3; Aetna, supra note 82, at 2-3.
95. The commentators suggested another solution for innocent pur-
chasers through the application of a type of integration concept whereby
defective transactions would be distinguished. Letter from O'Melveny
& Myers to Neal S. McCoy, Division of Corporate Finance, SEC, January
26, 1973, p. 5 [hereinafter cited as O'Melveny & Myers]; Letter from
Cravath, Swaine & Moore to Neal S. McCoy, Division of Corporate Fi-
nance, SEC, January 29, 1973, p. 3 [hereinafter cited as Cravath, et al.].
Letters on file in University of Minnesota Law Library; ALIA, supra
note 79, at 3; Shearman & Sterling, supra note 80, at 10; Platt, et al.,
supra note 79, at 6.
96. SEC Rule 146, Synopsis of the Provisions, Rule 146(b), 39 Fed.
Reg. 15261, 15263 (1974).
97. Id., § (d), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15267. See also id., Synopsis of the
Provisions, Rule 146(d), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15263-64. For example, section(d), stating the standards for offeree qualification and requiring the
issuer to make a reasonable inquiry as to this qualification, contains a
provision allowing the issuer to save the transaction by rescission where
he later discovers that the offeree was not qualified.
98. E.g., SEC Rule 146(a) (1), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15266 (1974).
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2. Limitation on the Manner of Offering-146 (c)
Section (c) deals with one of the key concepts of the Rule-
the non-public manner in which offers and sales are to be con-
summated. Throughout the development of Rule 146, from the
two proposed Rules to the Rule as finally issued, the essence
of this requirement has remained intact.90 Notwithstanding its
retention, however, the limitation on the manner of offering did
not go uncriticized, especially its apparent requirement of face
to face bargaining and its prohibition of seminar and promo-
tional meetings.
a. Face to Face Bargaining
The first proposed Rule required that securities be sold in
the context of a "negotiated transaction."'0 0 A negotiated trans-
action was defined as one in which there was direct communica-
tion between the issuer, or any person acting in his behalf, and
the purchaser or his investment representative.1 0 1 Many ob-
servors were disturbed by the use of the term "negotiated trans-
action" and by its implications; the requirement of actual negoti-
ation would preclude take-it-or-leave-it deals in which the issuer
merely stated its terms rather than negotiating them with the
offeree. They thought it unreasonable to assume that an issuer
could not offer securities without having previously established
its terms; as a practical matter, sales are often made on this
basis.10 2 The requirement that there be direct communication
was also a source of concern' 03 because many deals are made
in which a single lead purchaser, usually one of the larger in-
stitutional investors, actually conducts the negotiation with the
issuer as -to the terms of the offering. Although other investors
later join in the transaction, they discuss neither the terms of
the deal nor anything else with the issuer. Thus, the require-
ments of negotiation and direct communication would clearly
interfere with well established practices. 0 4 Moreover, many in-
99. Id. § (c), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15267; Second Proposed SEC Rule
146(c), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951, 28957 (1973); First Proposed SEC Rule
146(c), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26140 (1972).
100. First Proposed Rule 146(c), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26140 (1972).
101. Id., § (a) (3), 37 Fed. Reg. at 26140.
102. Letter from Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to
Neal S. McCoy, Division of Corporate Finance, SEC, January 29, 1973, p.2
[hereinafter cited as Merrill Lynch, et al.]. Letter on file in University
of Minnesota Law Library.
103. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 8.
104. Cravath, et al., supra note 95, at 1-2.
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stitutional investors thought that they were sophisticated enough
to decide for themselves just exactly how much communication
or negotiation was necessary. 05
In response to these criticisms, the Commission substituted
the term "direct communication" for that of "negotiated transac-
tion" in the second proposed Rule. This change essentially re-
quired that the offeree or his representative have the oppor-
tunity to elicit information about the issuer and to ask questions
of the issuer, or any person acting on his behalf, concerning the
terms of the transaction. 0 In the Rule as issued, the term "di-
rect communication" has been dropped altogether. However,
the notion that the offeree should be given the opportunity to
solicit information from the issuer has been shifted to section
(e), which deals with the kind of information that -the issuer
must provide to the offeree.10 7 Since this notion calls only for
the opportunity to communicate with the issuer,08 it presum-
ably does not make communication mandatory. Moreover, the
deletion of the "negotiated transaction" language apparently
obviates concern over take-it-or-leave-it deals.
b. Mass Advertising
In the first proposed Rule, the use of mass media, seminar
and promotional meetings, letters, or circulars was prohibited un-
less such activity was a part of a "negotiated transaction."'100
Commentators reacted adversely to this prohibition." 0 It was
thought -that the prohibition of seminar meetings would dis-
courage sophisticated investors from discussing a possible sale
of securities among themselves. It was also pointed out that sem-
inar meetings would allow the issuer to sound out potential offer-
ees as to their ability to meet the suitability requirements of the
105. ALIA, supra note 79, at 4. As the mechanics of closing a trans-
action are often handled by counsel, some commentators thought that
this provision could require the purchaser or representative to be ac-
tually present at the closing. Letter from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher,
to Neal S. McCoy, Division of Corporate Finance, SEC, January 17, 1973,p. 17 [hereinafter cited as Gibson, et al.l. Letter on file in University
of Minnesota Law Library.
106. Second Proposed SEC Rule 146 (a) (2), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951,
28957 (1973).
107. SEC Rule 146(a) (2), (e) (2), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15267 (1974).108. Id., 39 Fed. Reg. at 15267.
109. First Proposed SEC Rule 146(c), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26140(1972).
110. Aetna, supra note 82, at 5; Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note
79, at 9; Platt, et al., supra note 79, at 3-4; Shearman & Sterling, supra
note 80, at 7.
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Rule. Such meetings could be used, in turn, as a forum for
offerees to ask questions in order to fulfill their need for infor-
mation about the issuer. In general, it was thought that seminar
meetings performed valuable functions, other than -the actual
negotiation of a sale, which might possibly be prohibited by this
proposed condition.
The critics also argued that written communications de-
signed to determine the suitability of a potential offeree were
foreclosed by the language of the section."' They suggested
that the area of written communications be generally clarified
because, conceivably, it would be impossible for the issuer to
determine if a person was a suitable offeree without inad-
vertently violating the terms of the Rule. Finally, critics noted
that the section could be interpreted to exclude the presence
of a purchaser's attorney or family friend who possessed consid-
erable investment expertise but who did not meet all the re-
quirements of qualification as a representative of the offeree." 2
The presence of such an advisor could only be a beneficial aid
to the off eree in making an intelligent investment decision.
Although both the second proposed Rule and the Rule as
issued contain proscriptions of general advertising as in the first
proposed Rule, 'they permit written communications and meet-
ings which are directed to offerees and their representatives who
meet the standards of section (d), those who are considered to
be sufficiently sophisticated and knowledgeable. 1 3 The Rule as
issued adds the requirement that written communications be for
the purpose of providing information about the issuer in compli-
ance with the terms of section (e) . 1 4 These changes give the
issuer greater latitude in selecting the form of communication
with offerees, but do not lessen the requirement that the offer-
ees or their representatives be "suitable" before these devices
may be employed."15 Therefore, the problem of determining
such suitability without the use of these devices remains.
Thus, the Commission has apparently abandoned its effort
to assure intimacy between the issuer and offerees by requiring
"negotiated transactions," but it has retained strict controls on
the use of promotional devices."" That the Commission con-
111. Gibson, et al., supra note 105, at 18-19.
112. Dewey, et al., supra note 79, at 3.
113. Second Proposed SEC Rule 146(c) (1) (ii), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951,
28957 (1973).
114. SEC Rule 146(c) (3), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15267 (1974).
115. Id., §§ (c) (2), (3), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15267.
116. Id., §§ (c)(1), (2), (3), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15267.
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tinues to limit seminar meetings to qualified offerees is probably
an attempt to prevent promotional meetings such as those in
Continental Tobacco, where diverse groups of unsophisticated
investors were subjected to high pressure sales pitches.11 7
3. Nature of the Offerees-46 (d)
Section (d) of Rule 146 requires that the issuer have reason-
able grounds to believe that the offeree or his representative
has sufficient knowledge and experience in business affairs to
evaluate the risks of the investment and make an informed in-
vestment decision. Where an offeree is advised by a representa-
tive, moreover, the issuer must have reasonable ground to be-
lieve that the offeree is able to bear the economic risk of the
investment.118
Throughout the evolution of the Rule, critical comments
were made with regard to the three basic elements of the sec-
tion: the qualifications of the offeree, the qualifications of his
representative, and the offeree's ability to bear the economic risk
of the investment. The Commission made changes which par-
tially acknowledged these criticisms, but retained the substan-
tive requirements of the section.
a. The Qualifications of the Offeree
Commentators pointed out that this section should apply to
purchasers rather than offerees.11 9 The emphasis on offerees
was considered inconsistent with the test specified in section (e),
which limits to 35 the number of purchasers under the Rule.120
Not only was this emphasis a mere holdover from the traditional
view that there should be a numerical limit on the number of
offerees, 121 but it could make the validity of an exemption turn
upon the question of the suitability of an offeree who eventually
failed to purchase any stock.12 2  Were the emphasis on pur-
chasers, an issuer could "save" an exemption by not selling to
117. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
118. SEC Rule 146(d) (1) (ii), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15267.
119. Letter from Louis Loss to Neal S. McCoy, Division of Corporate
Finance, SEC, January 12, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Loss]. Letter on
file in University of Minnesota Law Library; Sullivan & Cromwell, su-
pra note 79, at 9-10; Cravath, et al., supra note 95, at 2; Dewey, et aL,
supra note 79, at 3; O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 95, at 4; Shearman
& Sterling, supra note 80, at 7-8.
120. Loss, supra note 119; Cravath, et al., supra note 95, at 2.
121. Loss, supra note 119.
122. Id.; O'Melveny & Meyers, supra note 95, at 4.
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an offeree who proved to be unsuitable. 123 The critics also noted
several practical considerations which supported an emphasis
upon purchasers. First, in many cases the less serious offerees
would be reluctant to supply the issuer with the information
necessary to ascertain their sophistication.' 24  Second, invest-
ment advisors often select purchasers from among their clients
only after a deal has been made.125 In effect, the argument
was that the issuer ought to be accorded a degree of flexibility
in making offers, given the rather broad statutory definition of
the term "offer" and the practical difficulty in separating the
process of determining the qualifications of the offerees from
that of discussing the -terms of the transaction. 120 Third, were
the term "purchaser" the touchstone, indiscriminate public of-
ferings would continue to be prohibited by the other provisions
of the Rule relating to the manner of the offering and the limi-
tations on disposition.' 27
As a final practical consideration, the critics thought that
the standards for determining the degree of offeree sophistica-
tion were too vague'28 and therefore urged the Commission to
delineate the factors to be considered in making this decision. "2
Representatives of the insurance industry suggested that certain
categories of offerees, such as institutional investors, automati-
cally qualify. 30 It was also suggested that the issuer be allowed
to rely on written representations by the -offerees that they pos-
sessed the necessary investment expertise. 3 1 In addition to elim-
inating the offeree emphasis, the somewhat technical criticism
was offered that the phrase "issuer and any person acting in his
behalf" be changed to read "issuer or any person acting in his
behalf." This change to the disjunctive presumably would allow
the issuer to delegate the investigation of offerees to an agent
so the issuer would not be responsible for having direct knowl-
edge of each offeree. 32
123. Cravath, et al., supra note 95, at 2; Loss, supra note 119.
124. Shearman & Sterling, supra note 80, at 7-8.
125. Id. This is similar to the problems seen in the requirement
of direct communication as it affects lead purchasers. See note 103 su-
pra and accompanying text.
126. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 9.
127. Loss, supra note 119.
128. Cravath, et al., supra note 95, at 2; ALIA, supra note 79, at 4.
129. Merrill Lynch, et al., supra note 102, at 2.
130. ALIA, supra note 79, at 4.
131. Platt, et al., supra note 79, at 4. Some observers suggested
that purchasers should be able to rely upon the issuer's representations
that all other purchasers and offerees met this requirement. Dewey,
et al., supra note 79, at 4.
132. Cravath, et al., supra note 95, at 2.
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In the second proposed Rule and in the Rule as issued, the
substance of the suitability of the offeree requirement has re-
mained unaltered.133 The second proposed Rule did add a clause
which allowed an issuer to save the exemption by withdrawing
the offer to a person who was shown by inquiry subsequent
to the offer to be an unsuitable offeree.134 In the synopsis ac-
companying the proposed Rule, the Commission noted that it
remained necessary for the issuer to demonstrate that it had
made a reasonable inquiry prior to making the offer, thus em-
phasizing that the Rule continued to apply to offerees and not
purchasers. 3 5
In the Rule as issued, the structure of the section was
changed for the avowed purpose of making the sequence of
events clearer: the issuer must inquire as to qualifications of
the offeree-that is, the offeree's business sophistication and
ability to bear the economic risk-immediately prior to the offer
and prior to the sale.'36 The saving clause that had been in-
cluded in the second proposed Rule was omitted because the new
structure of the section implies that an issuer can save the ex-
emption by rescinding either after an offer or a sale, provided
reasonable inquiry is made before each.137 Although the lan-
guage of the Rule as issued does not explicitly allow issuer re-
scission to save the exemption, the Commission's comments
should comfort those critics who feared that the exemption
would be destroyed by offers to persons who turned out to be
unqualified. Thus, the Rule retains the requirement that rea-
sonable inquiry be made; however, one may infer that if the
issuer makes a good faith attempt to comply with the section,
the exemption for an entire offering will not be jeopardized by
a few defective transactions, provided rescission is accomplished
with regard to such transactions. At least with respect to this
section, the result of the Commission's interpretation comes close
to the partial rescission as to defective transactions proposed by
some commentators with respect to the Rule as a whole.1 33
Moreover, this interpretation to some extent meets the criticism
133. SEC Rule 146 (d), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15267 (1974) ; Second Pro-
posed SEC Rule 146 (d) (i), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951, 28957 (1973).
134. Second Proposed SEC Rule 146(d) (3), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951,
28957 (1973).
135. Id., 38 Fed. Reg. at 28954.
136. SEC Rule 146(d), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15267 (1974).
137. Id., Synopsis of the Provisions, Rule 146(d), 39 Fed. Reg. at
15263-64.
138. See note 95 supra.
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that the section should apply to purchasers rather than of-
ferees. 3 9
b. The Qualification of the Offeree's Representative
The second basic element of section (d) of the Rule re-
lates to the qualifications of the offeree's representative. In the
first proposed Rule, if the offeree alone could not meet the sec-
tion's sophistication requirements, an offer could still be made
if the offeree was represented by an "investment representa-
tive. 1 40 An "investment representative" was defined in section
(a) as one who had knowledge and experience in business af-
fairs, was authorized to act as agent for the purchaser, and was
independent of the issuer.14 1
This investment advisor concept was severely criticized.
First, the critics noted a disparity between section (d), which con-
tained the basic terms governing the suitability of the offeree and
his representative, and section (a), which contained the definition
of investment representative. Section (d) stated that the issuer
need have only reasonable grounds to believe the representative
met the required qualifications, whereas section (a) stated these
qualifications in absolute terms. The critics feared that the ex-
emption might be lost where the investment representative did
not satisfy the conditions of section (a), even though the issuer
had reasonable grounds to believe that the representative was
qualified. They therefore suggested that section (a) be changed
to define an investment representative as one who the issuer
had reasonable grounds to believe met certain requirements."' 2
Second, the critics thought the Rule should not require that
the investment representative be one who acted as agent for
the purchaser in completing the transaction. They suggested
that the investment representative be allowed to play only an
139. Since the Rule states that the issuer must make an inquiry as to
either the sophistication or the risk-bearing capacity of the offeree be-
fore making an offer, it cuts down the amount of inquiry which must
be made before an offer. Therefore, the heaviest burden falls on the
issuer in making inquiry as to purchasers. The Rule still applies to
the issuer and its agent, and none of the other suggestions as to reliance
on written statements by issuer or offeree were adopted. No categories
of offerees could automatically qualify, and the Commission has not de-
fined the standards to be used by the issuer in defining business sophis-
tication. SEC Rule 146(d), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15267 (1974).
140. First Proposed SEC Rule 146(d) (1), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26140
(1972).
141. Id., 37 Fed. Reg. at 26140.
142. Shearman & Sterling, supra note 80, at 8; O'Melveny & Myers,
supra note 95, at 2.
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advisory role, with the offeree making the final decision whether
to purchase. Once the investment representative had revealed
the risks of the investment and generally given the offeree the
benefit of his expertise, the purpose of the representation was
fulfilled. 14 3 Third, -the critics suggested that specific types of
persons, such as lawyers, accountants, stockbrokers and invest-
ment bankers, be automatically qualified to act as investment
representatives. If different types of representatives could work
together, moreover, different persons could give advice within
the particular area of their expertise. 144 With joint representa-
tion, the liability as well as the responsibility could be divided,
thus encouraging qualified specialists, who otherwise would be
wary of taking full responsibility for. ,the transaction, 145 to con-
tribute their expertise.
Finally, the commentators impugned the requirement that
the investment representative be "independent" of the issuer as
too vague and restrictive; they suggested that the required de-
gree of independence be spelled out in greater detail and in more
familiar terms, such as "affiliate."1 40 They argued that, as a
practical matter, investment advisors and brokers frequently
have ties with the issuer, both in private placement transactions
and in transactions involving registered securities. 4 7 An invest-
ment representative who has an on-going relationship with the
issuer may be able to do a more competent job in representing
the offeree than one who is involved on a one shot basis. Fur-
thermore, some offerees are reluctant to enter a transaction if
they are the ones who must provide the representative's fee.
Rather than be required to maintain complete independence,
therefore, the investment representative should be required to
disclose the extent of any relationship he has with the issuer.1 4 8
143. Aetna, supra note 82, at 3; Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note
79, at 7.
144. Schneider & Zall, supra note 45, at F-3.
145. Id. The extent of the investment representative's liability was
considered ambiguous. Given the amount of discretion granted them
by the Rule, there was some fear of a strict accountability for the econ-
omic success of the investment.
146. Shearman & Sterling, supra note 80, at 3-4; Platt, et al., supra
note 79, at 2.
147. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 8; Dewey, et al., supra
note 79, at 2; Shearman & Sterling, supra note 80, at 3; O'Melveny &
Myers, supra note 95, at 3.
For example, counsel for the purchasers in some private placements
are chosen by the issuer, who also pays the fees. Investment bankers
arranging a deal for an issuer would probably be reluctant to turn a
potential offeree over to a competitor acting as counsel.
148. Shearman & Sterling, supra note 80, at 3-4.
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The Commission attempted to meet some of these criticisms
in the second proposed Rule. To indicate more clearly the role
of the representative vis-a-vis the offeree, 1 4 the Commission
changed the term "investment representative" to "offeree repre-
sentative." 150  To define with greater specificity the role of the
representative vis-a-vis the issuer, the Commission stated that
the offeree representative could not be an "affiliate, associate,
or employee" of the issuer, unless the offeree was a member
of the representative's immediate family or a relative living in
his home or a trust or corporation in which he owned 100 per-
cent of the beneficial interest.'5 ' As in the first proposed Rule,
the offeree representative was defined as one who had knowl-
edge and experience in business affairs and who was capable
of evaluating the risks of the investment, but no qualifying "rea-
son to believe" phrase was added in the definitional section.1 5 2
In an apparent retreat from the requirement that the represent-
ative act as an actual agent in the sale itself, the Commission
required only that before each purchase the offeree acknowledge
the representative as an agent for the purposes of evaluating
the risks of the transaction.1 5 3 As a final change, the Commis-
sion required the representative to disclose in writing to the of-
feree any existing or contemplated relationship with the issuer
as well as any previous relationship with the issuer within the
prior two years. 54
Rule 146 as finally issued has gone even further in respond-
ing to the suggestions of the critics. The offeree representative
is now defined as one who the issuer has reason to believe meets
certain stated requirements.' 55 It is now clear that there may
be more than one offeree representative and that each may sup-
ply specialized expertise, since the Rule requires that the repre-
sentative have "such knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters that he, either alone, or together with other
offeree representatives or the offeree, is capable of evaluating
the merits and risks of the prospective investment."'5 6 This pro-
vision indicates, moreover, that the offeree need not alone pro-
vide the expertise, but may qualify in conjunction with the rep-
149. Second Proposed SEC Rule 146, Synopsis of the Provisions, Rule
146(a) (1), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951, 28953 (1973).
150. Id., § (a) (1), 38 Fed. Reg. at 28957.
151. Id., § (a) (1) (i), 38 Fed. Reg. at 28957.
152. Id., § (a) (1) (ii), 38 Fed. Reg. at 28957.
153. Id., § (a) (1) (iii), 38 Fed. Reg. at 28957.
154. Id.. § (a) (1) (iv), 38 Fed. Reg. at 28957.
155. SEC Rule 146(a) (1), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15266 (1974).
156. Id., § (a) (1) (ii), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15266.
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resentative. In regard to the liability of the representative, the
Rule simply adds in a note following the section that offeree
representatives should be aware of the liabilities imposed on
broker-dealers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.1"7 In regard to his rela-
tionship with the issuer, the Rule states that the offeree repre-
sentative may not be "an affiliate, director, officer or other em-
ployee of the issuer, or beneficial owner of 10 percent or more
of any class of the equity securities or 10 percent or more of the
equity interest in the issuer. . . ," unless the offeree is a relative
no further removed than first cousin, or a trust or corporation
in which the representative owns all of the beneficial or equi-
table interest.158 This provision differs from the second proposed
Rule in that the term "associate" is dropped and is replaced by the
reference to officer or director and the ownership of 10 percent
of the issuer's equity stock. In addition, where the offeree rep-
resentative occupies insider status, the Rule no longer requires
that the relative live in the same home as the offeree representa-
tive if the relative is a first cousin or closer. 59
Under the Rule as issued, the offeree representative must
disclose to the offeree any material relationship with the issuer
which exists, is contemplated, or has existed within the previous
two years.160  A material relationship is defined as one which
a reasonable investor would consider significant. Notwithstand-
ing this disclosure, however, the Commission cautions that the
offeree representative is not relieved of the duty to act in the
interests of the offeree. 161 As in the second proposed Rule, the
offeree representative must be acknowledged prior to each
transaction as the representative of the offeree for purposes of
evaluating the risks of the investment. 162
In the evolution of section (d) the most significant changes
have occurred in its second basic element--the qualifications of
the offeree representative-especially with respect to his rela-
tionship with the issuer. The first proposed Rule required sim-
ply that the offeree representative be independent of the issuer.
157. Id., § (a) (1) (Note 1), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15267.
158. Id., § (a) (1) (i), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15266.
159. Id., § (a) (1) (i) (a), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15266. A definition of the
term "affiliate" is added in SEC Rule 146(a) (3), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261,
15267 (1974).
160. Id., § (a) (1) (iv), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15267.
161. Id., § (a) (1) (Note 3), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15267.
162. Note 2 following the section points out that this requirement
expressly disallows blanket acknowledgements. Id., § (a) (1) (Note 2),
39 Fed. Reg. at 15267.
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The second proposed Rule stated which relationships were disal-
lowed and required disclosure of others. The Rule as issued
adopts the basic language of the second proposed Rule with cer.
tain refinements, such as the emphasis upon disclosure of "ma-
terial" relationships. Perhaps these changes reflect the Commis-
sion's acknowledgement that fees of the offeree representative
may be paid by the issuer; however, the Commission has not
'addressed itself to this issue although it has had the opportunity
to do so. Moreover, despite the note which makes reference to
statutes governing broker-dealer and investment advisor liabil-
ity, the Commission has done little to clarify the extent of the
offeree representative's liability to the offeree. And, although it
is now clear that a single offeree representative need not alone
meet the business expertise requirement, the issuer is still not
given specific guidelines as to how the offeree representative may
meet the sophistication requirement of the rule. The Commis-
sion has evidently rejected the suggestions that certain categories
of persons automatically qualify for this role.
c. Offeree's Ability to Bear Economic Risk
The final basic element of section (d) is the requirement that
the offeree be able to bear the economic risk of the investment.
In the first proposed Rule the issuer was required to ascertain
whether the offeree could bear the risk of the investment. 1 0 3
In the second proposed Rule and in the Rule as issued this eco-
nomic risk test has been made applicable only to offerees who
require the services of an offeree representative. 1 4
The retention of this test in any form has been the subject
of adverse comment. Most critics have seen this requirement
as a departure from existing law, foreign to the disclosure phi-
losophy of the 1933 Act, and beyond the rule-making authority
of the Commission.'0 5 They have pointed out that the tradi-
tional goal of federal security regulation has been the disclosure
of relevant information about the issue to potential investors,
leaving the decision of whether to invest with the purchaser."10
As the requirement can be viewed as creating a presumption
in favor of wealthy investors, the less well-heeled investors may
163. First Proposed SEC Rule 146(d) (2), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26140
(1972).
164. SEC Rule 146(d) (2) (ii), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15267 (1974); Sec-
ond Proposed SEC Rule 146(d) (2), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951, 28957 (1973).
165. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 10, Cravath, et al., su-
pra note 95, at 2; Platt, et al., supra note 79, at 4-5.
166. Platt, et al., supra note 79, at 4.
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be prevented from taking advantage of private placement oppor-
tunities. It was also initially feared that the requirement would
specifically prohibit the original founders or promoters of a ven-
ture from taking part in the initial offering.0 7 However, the
limitation to offerees who require the services of an offeree rep-
resentative to meet the sophistication requirement should ob-
viate this concern since promoters will usually be able to meet
the requirement of business knowledge and experience.1 08
In response to the first proposed Rule, commentators com-
plained of the lack of standards to ascertain whether an offeree
could bear the economic risk.'0 9 To rectify this omission, in its
synopsis of the second proposed Rule and the Rule as issued,
the Commission deemed as important the considerations "wheth-
er the offeree could afford to hold unregistered securities for an
indefinite period, and whether, at the time of the investment, he
could afford a complete loss."170 Nonetheless, many commenta-
tors urged still more objective standards, such as the net worth
of the investor or the investor's gross income for tax purposes.'I
They also considered as relevant whether the securities were ac-
quired for cash or other liquid assets or whether other property
was exchanged.1'72 Presumably, investors suffer a more im-
mediate economic setback from a loss of liquid assets. The final
and overall problem posited with regard to the economic risk ele-
ment of section (d) was that it is subject to a "hindsight" evalua-
tion. The judgment of the issuer is likely to be evaluated only
after the investment has gone sour, when the economic condition
of the investors inevitably looks less optimistic than when the
167. Id.
168. The commentators have also mentioned some practical prob-
lems with regard to ascertaining the ability of offerees to bear the eco-
nomic risk. Offerees may not be willing to disclose the kind of infor-
mation necessary to make an informed judgement on this point. Sul-
van & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 10. Trustees may be unwilling and
perhaps prohibited from disclosing this kind of information about a trust
estate. At any rate, in the case of a trust it is argued that the benefi-
ciaries of the trust actually bear the risk, not the trust itself, and that
this rule does not call for information about them personally. Shear-
man & Sterling, supra note 80, at 9.
169. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 10; Cravath, et al.,
supra note 95, at 2; Dewey, et al., supra note 79, at 4; Shearman &
.Sterling, supra note 80, at 8-9.
170. SEC Rule 146, Synopsis of the Provisions, 39 Fed. Reg. 15261,
15262 (1974); Second Proposed SEC Rule 146, Synopsis of the Provi-
sions, 38 Fed. Reg. 28951, 28953 (1973).
171. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 10; Merrill Lynch, et
al., supra note 102, at 2; Dewey, et al., supra note 79, at 4.
172. Shearman & Sterling, supra note 80, at 8-9.
1974] 1151
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
transaction was originally entered into.173
d. Section (d) in Perspective
Overall, the Commission has retained the basic requirements
of section (d) throughout the evolution of Rule 146. These re-
quirements are intended to further the goals of protecting the
issuer by assuring the exercise of business sophistication, either
the issuer's own or its representative's, and by insulating inex-
perienced investors from economic disaster.
The section's emphasis on business knowledge and experi-
ence is analogous to the standard set forth in Ralston Purina,
where the Court determined that offerees should be able to
"fend for themselves"174 ; this emphasis is therefore consistent
with prevalent judicial opinion and clearly should be an essen-
tial part of any rule designed to implement the private place-
ment exemption. The requirement that the offeree be able to
bear the economic risk is probably inconsistent with the objec-
tives of the 1933 Act as originally conceived; however, it is not
entirely unprecedented in federal securities regulation gener-
ally. The Investment Advisors Act of 1940 provides that persons
who rely on the advice of an investment advisor registered pur-
suant to the Act be able to bear the economic risk of their in-
vestment.175 The rules of the NASD also require that broker-
dealers be cognizant of their clients' capabilities to bear the eco-
nomic risks of their investments. 176  And finally, the require-
ment is analogous to the fiduciary obligation of trustees not to
make improvident investments on behalf of their clients. 177 In
sum, the provisions of section (d) work toward the same goal,
that of keeping inexperienced, small investors out of the private
placement market. Given that the protection secured by regis-
tration under the 1933 Act is not available in such a market,
this seems an appropriate objective.
4. Access to or Furnishing of Information-146 (e)
Section (e) of Rule 146 deals with the kind of information
that must be made available to the offeree or his representative.
173. Platt, et at., supra note 79, at 5; Shearman & Sterling, supra
note 80, at 9.
174. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
175. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21
(1970).
176. See NASD Rules.
177. See note 175 supra.
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The conditions of this section are satisfied where the offeree or
his representative has "access" to the relevant information called
for, or where the issuer provides such information.1 8  The sec-
tion has generated several points of controversy: who must re-
ceive the information, where must the information be supplied,
what constitutes access, and what kind of information is re-
quired.
a. Who Must Receive the Information
The first proposed Rule stated that during the process of
negotiation the offeree or his representative must either have
the same kind of information, to the extent that it is available,
that a 1933 Act registration statement would make available or
that he at least must have access to such information. In either
case the offeree or his representative should have access to suffi-
cient additional data about the issuer to verify the accuracy of
that already in his possession. 179 Critics of this requirement
contended that its provisions should apply only to actual pur-
chasers, 80 not to offerees who have rejected offers or offerees
from whom offers have been withdrawn.28 ' It was thought that
"casual" investors might use the occasion of an offer to pry un-
necessarily into the affairs of the issuer without possessing any
serious intention of investing in the issue.
In response to this criticism, the Commission added a note
in the second proposed Rule declaring that information need not
be supplied to an offeree who indicates during the course of
the transaction that he is no longer interested in purchasing
stock.18 2 The Rule as issued retains this note and creates the
additional qualification that further information need not be
provided to any offeree or offeree representative to whom the
issuer or any person acting in his behalf has decided not to sell
securities, except in cases where the undertaking was based on
written materials submitted to the offeree or his representative
pursuant to section (c) (3) .183 These provisions should obviate
fears that information will be demanded frivolously. However,
178. SEC Rule 146 (e). 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15267 (1974).
179. First Proposed SEC Rule 146(e) (1), (2), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137,
26141 (1972).
180. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 11; Dewey, et aL, supra
note 79, at 5.
181. Aetna, supra note 82, at 4; Dewey, et aL, supra note 79, at 5.
182. Second Proposed SEC Rule 146(e) (2), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951, 28958
(1973).
183. SEC Rule 146(e), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15267 (1974).
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the Commission has remained firm in the requirement that sec-
tion (e) applies to offerees and not just purchasers.
b. When the Information Must be Supplied
The qualifying phrase in the first proposed Rule that infor-
mation should be provided "to the extent that it is available"
drew immediate comment.184 In the second proposed Rule and
the Rule as issued this phrase was partially clarified by the sub-
stitution of the requirement that information be provided if it
can be generated without "unreasonable effort or expense."1
Although the requirement has been somewhat clarified, the
question of what represents unreasonable expense or effort
remains.
c. What Constitutes Access
The statement in the first proposed Rule that the informa-
tion requirement could be satisfied by those offerees or repre-
sentatives who had "access" to the relevant information stirred
some commentary. The existing law concerning what consti-
tuted access was unclear, and this provision seemed only to com-
pound the confusion.186 Some commentators noted that if access
meant offerees could come in and examine corporate books
and records at will, issuers could justifiably rebel.187 It was
suggested, for example, that the Rule make it clear that the
right to monitor the issuer's operation was limited to the physi-
cal inspection of premises and the right to ask questions.188
Representatives of insurance companies complained at having to
comply formally with any aspect of this section; because of their
economic leverage they could obtain whatever information they
desired at their convenience. 8 9
The second proposed Rule added a note which required that
the access to information spring from economic bargaining
184. Aetna, supra note 82, at 4; Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note
79, at 11; O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 95, at 5.
185. SEC Rule 146(e) (1) (ii), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15267 (1974); Sec-
ond Proposed SEC Rule 146(e) (1) (i), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951, 28959 (1973).
186. Moreover, the critics asked how "access" was to be proved.
Letter from Real Estate Securities and Syndication Institute of the Na-
tional Association of Real Estate Boards to Neal S. McCoy, Division of
Corporate Finance, SEC, January 31, 1974, pp. 1-2 thereinafter cited as
Real Estate Board]. Letter on file in University of Minnesota Law Li-
brary.
187. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 13.
188. Id.
189. Aetna, supra note 82, at 5.
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power or an employment relationship with the issuer. 0° The
Rule as issued contains a similar note, adding "family relation-
ship" as a means of gaining access. 191 The inclusion of this note
raises the additional question of how much economic bargaining
power is necessary. Institutional investors such as insurance
companies will probably satisfy the standard; however, it can be
asserted that given the appropriate financial and economic cir-
cumstances even a modest investor will be in a commanding posi-
tion vis-a-vis the issuer.
d. What Kind of Information is Required
As noted above, the first proposed Rule intended that the
information be made available which would appear in a 1933
Act registration statement. 19 2 The commentators thought that
a requirement of all the technical information normally found
in a registration statement required by the 1933 Act was unduly
burdensome and that compliance with this section would entail
the same effort and expense as actual registration. 9 3  Therefore
one commentator suggested that the requirement be defined in
terms of information material to making an investment de-
cision.194 Others suggested that an issuer who registered un-
der the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, with the concomitant
duty to file the necessary reports, should automatically qual-
ify.19
5
In the second proposed Rule the Commission altered its ap-
proach and required the information normally contemplated by
Schedule A of the 1933 Act. 96 Where the offeree or his repre-
sentative did not have access to this information and the issuer
thus was compelled to supply it, the Commission delineated
more specific standards. If the issuer was registered under the
1934 Act, it could submit an annual 10-K report along with other
documents required by that Act, a brief description of the secu-
190.' Second Proposed SEC Rule 146(e) (1) (i) (Note), 38 Fed. Reg.
28951, 28957 (1973).
191. SEC Rule 146(e) (Note), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15267 (1974).
Moreover, in the Rule as issued the note has been placed at the begin-
ning of the section, perhaps indicating an added emphasis.
192. First Proposed SEC Rule 146(e) (1), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26140
(1972).
193. Gibson, et al., supra note 105, at 10-11.
194. Id. See also Real Estate Board, supra note 186, at 2.
195. Cravath, et al, supra note 79, at 2; Platt, et al, supra note
79, at 5.
196. Second Proposed SEC Rule 146(e) (1) (i), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951,
28957 (1973). Schedule A specifically sets forth the information re-
quired in a registration statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970).
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rities being offered, a statement as to the intended use of the
proceeds from the offering, and a recital of any adverse changes
in its affairs not reflected in reported documents. If the issuer
was not registered pursuant to the 1934 Act, it could submit
Schedule A information. If audited financial statements were
not available, the issuer could use Schedule A financial state-
ments. If the issuer would be required to submit S-2 statements
were it to register securities under the 1933 Act, such statements
could also be used, even though unaudited.197 As with the first
proposed Rule, observers found these information requirements
too demanding. The Schedule A requirements were inappro-
priate because they called for more detailed information than
was necessary. The observers suggested instead that the section
require "substantially" the same information required by Sched-
ule A, thereby allowing the issuer to omit nonessential data.1 8
The basic requirement of the Rule as issued is that the of-
feree or his representative have access to or be provided with
Schedule A type information, with the structure of the Rule
having been changed to reflect this either/or nature of the re-
quirement.19 Again, where the information requirement is to
be satisfied by the issuer's production of information for the
offeree, the Commission has provided more detailed standards.
If the issuer registers under the 1934 Act, the following informa-
tion should be provided:
the information contained in the annual report required to be
filed under the Exchange Act or a registration statement on
Form S-1 under the Act or on Form 10 under the Exchange
Act, whichever filing is the most recent required to be filed,
and the information contained in any definitive proxy statement
required to be filed pursuant to Section 14 of the Exchange Act
and in any reports or documents required to be filed by the
issuer pursuant to Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act,
since the filing of such annual report or registration statement
200
197. Second Proposed SEC Rule 146(e) (1) (ii) (a), (b), 38 Fed. Reg.
28951, 28958 (1973). The second proposed Rule further required the
issuer to inform the offeree of the risk of the investment and the
restricted nature of the securities. Id., § (e) (3), 38 Fed. Reg. at 28958.
Form 10-k is required to be filed annually pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78n, o (1970). See 17 C.F.R. 249.310 (1973). Form S-2 is required
in connection with the issuance of securities of certain corporations in
the development stage. See 17 C.F.R. 239.12 (1973).
198. Schneider & Zall, supra note 45, at F-4.
199. SEC Rule 146(e) (1), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15267 (1974).
200. Id., § (e) (1) (a), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15267. There must also be
provided the various material information mentioned in the proposed
Rules.
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If the issuer is not registered under the 1934 Act, essentially
the same requirements are retained as were present in the sec-
ond proposed Rule.20 1 The Rule as issued also specifies that ex-
hibits, normally filed as part of the registration process of the
1933 or 1934 Act, need not actually be distributed to offerees
if the exhibits are available to them on request.202
An added feature of the Rule as promulgated is that the
issuer must allow the offeree or his representative "the oppor-
tunity to ask questions of, and receive answers from, the issuer
or any person acting on its behalf concerning the terms and
conditions of the offering .. .-1o3 This language is considered
a substitute for the term "direct communication" which was de-
leted from section (c) governing the manner of the offering.2- 4
The issuer must also divulge to the offeree whether it or any
of its affiliates has any relationship with the offeree representa-
tive, past, present or future, and whether it has received any
compensation as a result of such relationship.2 0 5
e. Section (e) in Perspective
The overall effect of section (e) as it has developed and
been finally issued is to provide a significant departure from
the traditional information requirements under existing law, at
least as seen by the court in Continental Tobacco. The holding
in that case implied that the information requirement could be
met only by an offeree who enjoyed access to relevant informa-
tion by virtue of insider status. 20 6 The rule, on the other hand,
suggests that information can be provided to offerees who do
not otherwise have access to it, but by defining access in terms
of insider status or economic bargaining power, the Commission
may have used the access concept in a more restricted sense
than would many courts outside the Fifth Circuit
In terms of the kinds of information which may be provided
under the Rule, the Commission has for the most part provided
express standards, but the Rule is still subject to the criticism
that the cost of providing such information is prohibitive and
may exclude small issuers from a Rule 146 private placement.
With respect to the expense of providing information, the Rule
201. Id., 39 Fed. Reg. at 15267.
202. Id., § (e) (1) (c), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15268.
203. Id., § (e) (2), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15268.
204. Id., Synopsis of the Provisions, Rule 146(c), 39 Fed. Reg. at
15263.
205. Id., § (e) (3), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15268.
206. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
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still does not state with any clarity what is meant by "unrea-
sonable expense" nor what alternatives are available should it
be determined that the production of Schedule A type informa-
tion is unreasonably expensive.
5. Business Combinations-146 (f)
In response to criticism that the first proposed Rule did not
apply to business combinations, section (f) was added in the sec-
ond proposed Rule.2 0 7  In this section, substantially retained in
the Rule as issued, the Commission attempted to provide for situ-
ations where the offeree representative is an officer or director
of an acquired company. Such a person can be an offeree repre-
sentative for stockholders of the acquired company if certain dis-
closures are made and if he possesses the requisite expertise.20 8
Stockholders may choose their own offeree representative, and
it then becomes the responsibility of either the issuer or the ac-
quired corporation to pay the reasonable costs of the representa-
tion. 20 9 Except for these specific provisions the same require-
ments apply to offers made in the business acquisition context
as apply generally. 210
Solicitations made to stockholders of the acquired corpora-
tion for the purpose of offering to act as their offeree repre-
sentative are not considered offers within the broader meaning
of the Rule, provided certain conditions are met. The officer
or director is generally required to make disclosures as to the
nature of the transaction and his interest therein. 211 This disclo-
sure requirement highlights the purpose of the section, which
is to see that the corporate offeree representative does not take
advantage of his position to induce stockholders to enter a trans-
action contrary to their best interests. Although the disclosure
requirement parallels that of section (d), relating to the nature
of the offeree, section (e) does not contain any provision akin
to the economic ability to bear the risk test of section (d).
Following the publication of the second proposed Rule, com-
mentators drew the Commission's attention to two basic problem
areas. First, under this section it is possible for a single dissi-
207. Second Proposed SEC Rule 146, Synopsis of the Provisions,
146(c), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951, 28953 (1973).
208. Id., § (f) (2), 38 Fed. Reg. at 28958.
209. Id., § (f) (2) (ii), 38 Fed. Reg. at 28958.
210. Id., § (f) (3), 38 Fed. Reg. at 28958.
211. Id., 38 Fed. Reg. at 28958.
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dent stockholder to frustrate the transaction by refusing to
"sophisticatize" himself through the voluntary selection of an
offeree representative, since the decision remains with the un-
sophisticated offeree whether to qualify for the exemption by
utilizing the services of such a representative.212 Even where
-the unsophisticated offeree chooses not to qualify, however, the
acquisition can take place if the securities are registered, but
registration is time consuming, costly, and perhaps disadvan-
tageous from a tax standpoint.213 Ironically, after a registra-
tion, the acquisition can proceed even though a dissident share-
holder is no more informed about the deal than he was before-
the 1933 Act does not require offerees to understand the pro-
spectus submitted to them. Moreover, state corporation law
generally recognizes that a dissenting shareholder has dissent
and appraisal rights in "fundamental" or "organic" corporate ac-
tions such as acquisitions. Such rights should provide the dis-
satisfied shareholder with an adequate avenue for legitimate ex-
pression of his dissent.214 The critics therefore recommended
that all shareholders be required to accept the services of some
kind of offeree representative when they cannot meet the suit-
ability requirement on their own.
The second basic problem with the application of section (f)
is that the management of the acquired company may not meet
the sophistication requirements of an offeree representative.
Arguing that there should be a limit upon the paternalism of
federal securities law, Carl Schneider urged that where share-
holders have sufficient faith in the management of their corpo-
ration, even though it is not financially sophisticated, they
should be able to rely upon the judgment of that management.
Schneider noted that the Commission's position regarding the
sophistication requirement's fulfillment by alternative means
might be self-defeating. To bring in an outside representative
for all the shareholders might prove costly and time consuming
since a representative must acquaint himself with the situation;
to avoid the sophistication problem entirely by completing a reg-
istration might be fruitless since those who receive the informa-
tion by definition cannot understand it. Schneider therefore
recommended that the sophistication requirement be waived
with regard to the management of the acquired corporation in
212. Id, Synopsis of the Provisions, Rule 146(f), 38 Fed. Reg. at
28955.
213. Schneider, et al, supra note 92, at F-6.
214. Id., at F-5.
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its role of offeree representative. 21
In the Rule as issued, the Commission appears to have been
unmoved by these two basic criticisms. 210  It is still possible for
a single dissenting shareholder to defeat a merger by refusing
to accept the services of an offeree representative in order to
meet the sophistication requirements of the Rule. In the com-
mentary accompanying the Rule, the Commission conceded that
the protections offered to the dissident shareholder by state cor-
poration laws may be adequate, but stood firm in its view that
the requirements of federal securities law were paramount, even
where these requirements would serve to defeat merger or re-
organization attempts. 217  Moreover, the Commission made no
special provision for the qualification of the acquired corpora-
tion's management as an offeree representative in terms of meet-
ing the business sophistication standard.
Although these two basic problem areas remain unsolved,
the Rule as issued does reflect several changes. First, the def-
inition of "business combination" is lifted directly from Rule 145,
thereby excluding the "exchange offers" which had been included
in the second proposed Rule's definition of "business combina-
tion. ' 218  The reason given for this change is that exchange of-
fers are voluntary transfers which do not require all the protec-
tions provided by this section.2 19  Second, the issuer need no
longer obtain an agreement from the offerees that the securities
issued will not be resold without a registration or other exemp-
tion under the Act. Although such agreements are generally
required under section (h),220 the Commission sees the require-
ment as too burdensome in this context. 22' The Rule makes
it clear, however, that the stock is still restricted in the absence
of such agreements, and the other restrictions imposed by sec-
tion (h), designed to inhibit further distribution of the stock,
are still in effect. 222 Finally, the second proposed Rule con-
tained a statement that solicitations to stockholders for purposes
215. Id., at F-6.
216. SEC Rule 146(f), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15268 (1974).
217. Id., Synopsis of the Provisions, Rule 146(f), 39 Fed. Reg. at
15264; see SEC Rule 145. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1973).
218. SEC Rule 146(f) (1), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15268 (1974).
219. Id., Synopsis of the Provisions, Rule 146(f), 39 Fed. Reg. at
15264.
220. Id., §§ (f) (2), (h) (4), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15268.
221. Id., Synopsis of the Provisions, Rule 146(f), 39 Fed. Reg. at
15264.
222. Id., § (f) (2) (Note), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15268. Inasmuch as such
agreements are generally regarded as mere formalities, this change is
likely of little significance.
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of becoming their offeree representative under this section
would not be considered "offers" within the Rule. The Commis-
sion has decided that this is implicit in the Rule as issued and
therefore has omitted the specific statement to that effect.223
As a final comment upon section (f), perhaps the Commis-
sion would have been well-advised to heed the advice of its crit-
ics. Because the application of Rule 146 to business combina-
tions may be frustrated by recalcitrant unsophisticated share-
holders, the utility of this section is sharply limited. A look
at the realities of the corporate merger process tends to suggest
that the Commission is misguided in its balancing of considera-
tions.
6. Limitation on the Number of Purchasers-146 (g)
Section (g) involves the limit on the number of purchasers
who may purchase securities under the Rule. In the develop-
ment of this section, the main areas of controversy have been
the scope of the limitation on the number of purchasers and
the definition of a "person" for purposes of compliance with the
limitation.
a. The Number of Purchasers
The first proposed Rule stated that under the Rule no more
than 35 persons could purchase securities from an issuer during
a consecutive 12-month period.224 This represented a significant
departure from existing law as well as from other provisions
of the Rule in that emphasis was shifted from offerees to pur-
chasers. Nonetheless, the purchaser orientation was retained in
the second proposed Rule and in the Rule as issued.2 2 5
Many critics of the first proposed Rule considered as inap-
propriate the method of computing the 12-month period for meas-
uring the number of purchasers. In the interest of certainty
on the part of the purchaser, they thought that the 12-month
period should be measured up to the time of sale to the particu-
lar purchaser so that the purchaser could investigate to deter-
mine how many sales had previously taken place. With a "roll-
223. Id., Synopsis of the Provisions, Rule 146 (f), 39 Fed. Reg. at
15264.
224. First Proposed SEC Rule 146, Synopsis of the Provisions,
146(f), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26139 (1972).
225. SEC Rule 146 (g), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15268 (1974); Second Pro-
posed SEC Rule 146 (g), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951, 28953 (1973).
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ing" 12-month period, the purchaser had no way of knowing how
many more purchasers would subsequently become involved.22'-
In any event, it was suggested that the purchaser be able to
rely on the written representation of the issuer that it would
sell to only 35 persons. 227  Other critics rejected the 12-month
period in toto, suggesting instead an integration approach. Un-
der this approach, sales which are related in some manner would
be applied to such offerings regardless of the time period in-
volved. 228  The sales related to the financing of a particular
project undertaken by the issuer, for example, could be consid-
ered a single offering in which no more than 35 purchasers could
take part.229 In support of their integration approach, the critics
pointed out that a rolling 12-month period could lead to a con-
tinuous offering in which sales were carefully spaced to include
no more than 35 purchasers in any given year but which actually
related to the same purpose.2 30  Finally, some critics suggested
that the numerical limitation ought to be calculated separately
for each class of security.231 Since the quality of an offering
often depends on its classification-for example, a debt offering
involves different risks and expectations than those in a common
stock offering-the limitation should be counted separately.' 2
As a practical matter, moreover, corporations frequently issue
different classes of securities for different projects.2 33
The second proposed Rule retained the limit of 35 purchasers
within any 12-month period, but the Commission adopted the
suggestion that 35 purchasers be allowed for each separate class
of stock issued.234 The proposal also made the limitation appli-
cable to sales made outside the Rule pursuant to the general
private placement exemption of section 4(2) of the 1933 Act.
As a result, observers immediately cited this extension as an
226. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 14.
227. Dewey, et al., supra note 79, at 7.
228. Cravath, et al., supra note 95, at 3; Dewey, et al., supra note
79, at 8; Gibson, et al., supra note 105, at 9; O'Melveny & Myers, supra
note 95, at 5; Shearman & Sterling, supra note 80, at 11.
229. Another basis suggested for an offering distinction was that of
whether the sales involved cash or non-cash transactions. Non-cash of-
ferings are likely to be issued to promoters or shareholders in an ac-
quisition; cash offerings are likely to be used for different reasons, in-
volving a different class of purchasers. Platt, et al., supra note 79, at
5-6.
230. Shearman & Sterling, supra note 80, at 11.
231. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 14; ALIA, supra note
79, at 8; Dewey, et al., supra note 79, at 8.
232. Dewey, et al., supra note 79, at 7-8.
233. Id.
234. Second Proposed SEC Rule 146(g) (2), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951,
28958 (1973).
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infringement upon the application of the existing private place-
ment exemption and therefore as a violation of the notion that
the Rule was to be non-exclusive.23 5 They thought the issuer
should be protected from the arbitrariness of the limitation be-
cause, despite any precautions, a hidden 36th purchaser could
emerge to destroy the exemption. 23 0
In the Rule as issued, there may be no more than 35 persons
purchasing securities per any "offering" made pursuant to the
Rule-a rejection of the 12-month rolling period in favor of the
integration concept suggested by so many critics.23 T Although
nowhere in the Rule itself is the term "offering" defined,23 8 Pre-
liminary Note 3 suggests some factors relevant to the number
of sales considered as part of the same offering. These factors
are:
(a) whether the offerings are part of a single plan of financ-
ing; (b) whether the offerings involve issuance of the same
class of security; (c) whether the offerings are made at or
about the same time; (d) whether the same type of considera-
tion is to be received; and (e) whether the offerings are made
for the same general purpose.23 9
Section (b) (1) provides the aforementioned "safe harbour" pro-
vision regarding sales made prior to or later than six months of
any particular sale within the Rule.240 This "safe harbour,"
along with the integration concept, should help allay fears that
a remote 36th purchaser will materialize to destroy the exemp-
tion. Moreover, since the Rule as issued states the 35-person
limit in terms of purchases made in an offering under the Rule,
it would appear to exclude sales to .purchasers in an offering pur-
suant to the section 4(2) exemption, unlike the previous proposed
Rules.241
b. The Definition of Person
In the development of Rule 146, a source of continuing con-
troversy has been the question of what persons are to be counted
in determining compliance with the 35-person limitation. Sec-
tion (a) of the first proposed Rule defined "person," for the pur-
poses of section (g), to exclude from separate enumeration rela-
235. Schneider & Zall, supra note 45, at f-7 to -8.
236. For example, options and warrants issued in the previous
12-month period could be exercised at a time which would kill the ex-
emption. Id.
237. SEC Rule 146(g) (1), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15268 (1974).
238. Id., § (g) (1) (Note), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15268.
239. Id., Preliminary Note no. 3, 39 Fed. Reg. at 15268.
240. Id., § (b) (1), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15267. See note 91 supra.
241. SEC Rule 146(g) (1), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15268 (1974).
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tives of a purchaser who lived in the same household and trusts,
corporations or other associations in which the purchaser held
100 percent of the beneficial interest.242 In contrast, business
associations formed for the express purpose of acquiring secu-
rities offered under this exemption were not to be counted as
a single person; rather, the individual members of such asso-
ciations were to be counted separately for purposes of determin-
ing the 35-purchaser figure.243
Commentary abounded. Many critics thought the Commis-
sion was too strict in excluding from enumeration only those
trusts and corporations wholly owned by a person purchasing
under the Rule. They suggested the section be liberalized to
exclude from separate enumeration any corporation or trust
where the purchaser was a majority owner or primary benefici-
ary.244 It was argued that the majority owner or primary bene-
ficiary would be the one to make controlling decisions, or at least
would be the primary risk bearer, and thus should be treated
as one with the institution.245  Observers also suggested that
family members who live in separate households be counted as
a single person for purposes of the section. 240 Many trusts in
a position to invest have as beneficiaries extended families, the
members of which do not live under the same roof; the exemp-
tion would be quickly exhausted in a purchase by a trust repre-
senting a large family.247
Some critics argued for single-person treatment in cases
where an investment decision is made by an investment advisor
or trustee who has sole discretion to purchase for a number of
different investors. 248 They pointed out that this argument rep-
resented a position taken by the Commission in at least one
no-action letter and hence could be considered as part of the
common law interpretation of the section 4(2) exemption..2 19
This approach would allow account managers for insurance com-
242. First Proposed SEC Rule 146(a) (1) (i) (a), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137,
26140 (1972).
243. Id., § (a) (1) (i) (b), 37 Fed. Reg. at 26140. Purchasers for cash
of more than $250,000 of securities were completely excepted. Id., (f),
37 Fed. Reg. at 26141.
244. Aetna, supra note 82, at 4.
245. Shearman & Sterling, supra note 80, at 1-2.
246. Id. at 2.
247. Id.
248. Aetna, supra note 82, at 4-5; Gibson, et al., supra note 105, at
14.
249. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 6-7, citing Letter from
Baldwin Bane, Director of Division of Corporate Finance, SEC to Bankers
Trust Co., March 5, 1946.
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panies and managers of trust accounts to participate in an offer-
ing without quickly dissipating the exemption.2 50 Absent this
approach, investment advisors would be put in the position of
having to choose among clients to determine who would be al-
lowed to participate in a particular issue.2 51 If only one person
actually made the decision, it was considered appropriate that
it be counted as a sale to one person.
Although the first proposed Rule exempted cash purchases
of greater than $250,000, that threshold was considered by many
to be too high.252 The Commission apparently selected this fig-
ure because it represented a typical purchase by an institutional
investor,253 but some commentators felt that it should be low-
ered to $100,000.254 Moreover, as securities are frequently sold
in "roll over" transactions which involve an exchange of out-
standing securities for a new issue, commentators saw little rea-
son to limit this exception to cash transactions. Exchanges of
other property for securities are also commonly effected, partic-
ularly in the context of corporate acquisitions. It was thus
thought that purchasers should be able to aggregate their pur-
chases within a 12-month period until they reached the $250,000
level. Quite often a firm commitment is made to purchase this
amount with different "takedowns" or actual sales over a period
of time. For example, in the financing of construction projects,
sales often take place as the work progresses.255
In the second proposed Rule, most of the basic reforms sug-
gested by the commentators were rejected; however, some
changes were made. The definition of "person" was incorpo-
rated in this section instead of being placed in the definitional
section, section (a).256 However, this change of location re-
flected no concomitant change in substance. The second pro-
posed Rule did spell out with greater specificity the types of
organizations that could be considered single persons for pur-
poses of the Rule, provided, of course, that they were not formed
250. Shearman & Sterling, supra note 80, at 1-2; ALIA: supra note
79, at 7.
251. Shearman & Sterling, supra note 80, at 1-2.
252. Aetna, supra note 82, at 3; Cravath, et al, supra note 95, at
3-4.
253. O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 95, at 5.
254. Aetna, supra note 82, at 3; Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note
79, at 14; Gibson, et al, supra note 105, at 5.
255. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 15; Cravath, et aL, supra
note 95, at 4; Dewey, et al., supra note 79, at 6; Gibson, et al., supra
note 105, at 5.
256. Second Proposed SEC Rule 146(g) (1), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951,
28958 (1973).
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for the specific purpose of investing in the securities offered:
namely, any "corporation, partnership, association, joint stock
company, trust or unincorporated organization or other entity
that is organized for the specific purpose of acquiring the se-
curities offered. ' '2 '7 It also excluded from enumeration "any
person who purchases or agrees in writing to purchase for cash
securities of the issuer in aggregate amount of $150,000 or more,
either in a single payment or in installments .... "28 Thus, the
suggestions regarding the lowering of the threshold amount for
this exception and the views as to the aggregation of a series
of "take down" purchases were heeded, but the Rule retained
the requirement that the purchases be made in cash. Similarly,
the proposal added specific categories of persons who were ex-
cepted from enumeration. Among them were directors or offi-
cers of the issuer; a 100 percent subsidiary of the issuer and
a 100 percent parent of the issuer; a bank which lends money evi-
denced by a debt security; 35 or fewer persons within a 12-month
period who purchase pursuant to a stock option plan; and 35 or
fewer persons who purchase within a 12-month period pursuant
to a business combination. All these persons were otherwise
required to meet the conditions of the Rule.2 5 9
Finally, the Commission added a note which stated that
"[o] ffers or sales to any person, including an investment advisor
with or without discretionary authority, acting on behalf of
other persons shall be deemed to be offers and sales to such
persons. ' 260  Thus, the Commission expressly rejected the sug-
gestions that discretionary investment advisors be treated as a
single purchaser for purposes of the section. With respect to
the reference to "offers" in this note, one critic declared it to
be inappropriate inasmuch as the section was concerned only
with purchasers. 261 It was suggested, moreover, that if an ex-
ception was going to be made for banks that make loans evi-
denced by debt issues, the exception should be extended to other
financial institutions that invest in debt securities. 20 2
The Rule as issued retains basically these same exemptions
and exclusions.263 However, because of the adoption of the inte-
gration concept, the Commission felt justified in dispensing with
the series of special exemptions made available in the second
257. Id., § (g) (3) (i), 38 Fed. Reg. at 28958.
258. Id., § (g) (3) (ii) (a), 38 Fed. Reg. at 28959.
259. Id., § (g) (3) (ii), 38 Fed. Reg. at 28959.
260. Id., § (g) (3) (i) (Note), 38 Fed. Reg. at 28959.
261. Schneider & Zall, supra note 45, at F-8.
262. Id.
263. SEC Rule 146(g), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15268 (1974).
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proposed Rule: directors and officers, bank lenders, subsidiaries
and parent companies, employee plans and business combina-
tions.2 64 In Preliminary Note 5, which is referred to in the sec-
tion, the Commission again states that customers of investment
advisors, brokers and bank trust advisors (specifically mentioned
for the first time in this context) are to be considered offerees
and purchasers regardless of the amount of their investment dis-
cretion.265 Thus, once again the Commission stands firm on this
issue.266
c. Section (g) in Perspective
The evolution of section (g) indicates that the Commission
is consistently firm in its basic purpose of placing a limit on
the number of purchasers under the Rule. The decision to de-
fine this limitation in terms of the number of purchasers rather
than offerees benefits the issuer because it relieves it of the diffi-
cult task of deciding when an offer has been made for purposes
of meeting a limitation on the number of offerees. The limita-
tion on the number of -persons who may become involved in
a private placement has its origins in existing law, where the
widely accepted rule of thumb is that offers can be made to
25 or fewer persons. Although the section 4(2) exemption does
not seem to involve a rigid insistence on the exact number as
the Rule does, the Rule is more liberal in that the emphasis
is on purchasers rather than offerees and that the number al-
lowed is 35 rather than 25.
The decision to substitute the integration concept for the
rolling 12-month period is probably a sound one. However,
there remains the problem of determining what particular sales
may be grouped under the same offering; the relative certainty
derived from -using the 12-month period of the proposed Rule
is sacrificed to the rationality of the integration approach. Fi-
nally, the rejection of the notion that an investment advisor
should be able to purchase for a number of people and still
count as one person is probably correct in light of the possibil-
ities of employing this device as a sham for a widespread distri-
bution.
264. Id., Synopsis of the Provisions, Rule 146(g), 39 Fed. Reg. at
15265.
265. Id-, Preliminary Note no. 5, 39 Fed. Reg. at 15266.
266. By placing the observation in a preliminary note, the commis-
sion also skirts the criticism that a reference to "offerees" is inappropri-
ate in a section dealing with purchasers.
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7. Limitation on Distribution-146 (h)
Section (h) of the proposed Rules and the Rule as finally
issued requires basically that the issuer make reasonable inquiry
and take reasonable care to assure that purchasers are not "un-
derwriters" and that the securities sold do not undergo further
distribution.26 7  The steps taken by the issuer should include,
but are not limited to: making inquiries to determine for whose
account the securities are being purchased, legending stock cer-
tificates, issuing stop-transfer instructions to transfer agents,
and obtaining letters from purchasers indicating their invest-
ment intent. The Commission has made few changes in this
section throughout the development of the Rule, 2 8 but the
structure of the section has been rearranged slightly and, in the
Rule as issued, a reference to section 2 (11) of the 1933 Act has
been added in order to define the term "underwriter. '200
Section (h) has remained fundamentally unchanged in spite
of several critical comments. Because in some states it is illegal
for insurance companies to agree not to sell securities, 1 0 it was
suggested that a special exemption for insurance companies be
included in the provision. It was also suggested that debt securi-
ties be exempted, as they are not often resold and frequently are
subject to retirement by the issuer.27 1 Some critics thought there
should be more specific guidelines as to what represented a rea-
sonable inquiry on the part of the issuer.2 72  Others wondered
whether further measures, not articulated in the Rule, would be
required to prevent distribution.2 7 3 Finally, one commentator
observed that this was one section where written assurances of
compliance with its conditions should be effective, thus allowing
issuer and purchaser alike to rely on the exemption.2' 4
The steps specified in section (h) reflect common practices
267. SEC Rule 146(h), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 152568 (1974); Second
Proposed SEC Rule 146(h), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951, 28959 (1973); First Pro-
posed SEC Rule 146(g) (1), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26141 (1972).
268. SEC Rule 146 (h) (1)-(4), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261, 15268 (1974).
269. Id., § (h), 39 Fed. Reg. at 15268. The Commission has also
noted that the requirement as to letters of investment intent is inappli-
cable in the business combination context but that securities sold in
such a transaction are nevertheless restricted. Id., § (h) (4) (Note),
39 Fed. Reg. at 15268.
270. Dewey, et al., supra note 79, at 9; ALIA, supra note 79, at 6.
271. Dewey, et al., supra note 79, at 9-10.
272. Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 79, at 15.
273. Schneider & Zall, supra note 45, at F-8; Sullivan & Cromwell,
supra note 79, at 15.
274. Cravath, et al., supra note 95, at 4.
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required in the section 4(2) exemption under existing law.2 7 5
That the Rule requires a greater, yet unspecified, effort on the
part of the issuer perhaps indicates that the Commission feels
such measures are too often viewed as mere formalities and dis-
regarded outside the Rule. Thus section (h) requires, but does
not expressly define, reasonable care, establishing a kind of good
faith requirement on the part of the issuer.
8. Reporting Requirement
The first and second proposed Rules contained a section
which established certain reporting requirements as a condition
of compliance with the Rule.276 In the Rule as issued, the Com-
mission dropped the reporting requirement section altogether,
although it did reserve the right to amend the Rule in the fu-
ture to include such a provision..2 7 7  The kinds of information
required by the proposed Rules included the identity of the is-
suer, the securities sold, the identity of all purchasers (including
persons satisfying the section (f) requirement), and the names
of offeree representatives and other persons acting on behalf
of the issuer.278
While the proposed Rules were in circulation, the reporting
requirement generated untold animadversion, questioning the
very authority of the Commission to require such information.27 0
Not only was the requirement viewed as irrelevant and unneces-
sary,'2 0 but it seemed to defeat a basic purpose of the private
placement exemption-the avoidance of the burdensome regis-
tration requirements of the 1933 Act. Were the reporting re-
quirement a condition of compliance with the Rule, a violation
of a purely administrative mandate would cause the issuer to
lose the exemption even though it was otherwise in com-
pliance.28 1  On the practical side, moreover, many investors
would object to having information about them registered for
public scrutiny; providing for such scrutiny would tend to dis-
275. Cromwell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release
No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957).
276. Second Proposed SEC Rule 146(i), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951, 28959
(1973); First Proposed SEC Rule 146(h), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26141
(1972).
277. SEC Rule 146, Synopsis of the Provisions, 39 Fed. Reg. 15261,
15265 (1974).
278. Second Proposed SEC Rule 146(i), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951, 28959
(1973).
279. Schneider & Zall, supra note 45, at F-9.
280. Platt, et al., supra note 79, at 6.
281. Cravath, et al., supra note 95, at 4-5.
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courage their investment.28 2 Thus, given the conditions already
imposed on the issuer by the Rule, the Commission acted respon-
sibly in rejecting this potentially troublesome condition.
V. CONCLUSION
In promulgating SEC Rule 146, the Commission is attempt-
ing to provide objective guidelines for the sale of securities un-
der section 4(2) of the 1933 Act. The need for more objective
guidelines has been generated by the confusion resulting from
the administrative and judicial opinions which have attempted
to define the parameters of the private placement exemption.
This uncertainty may be attributed in part to the difficulty in
giving substance to the terse abstraction of section 4(2). How-
ever, the language in court opinions is frequently overly broad.
With respect to cases which hold against finding the exemption,
Carl Schneider has made the following observation:
[V]irtually every case holding the exemption unavailable in-
volved a massive public offering without regard to the sophis-
tication or risk bearing capabilities of the offerees and/or fraud
and/or a total failure of the issuer to carry the burden of proof
that the offering was made in the proper manner.28 3
Rule 146 has been declared non-exclusive so that, at least
theoretically, compliance with the Rule is an alternative to at-
tempting to meet whatever standards are discerned to exist un-
der section 4(2)'s general provisions. There is some concern,
however, that the Commission and the courts may tend to apply
standards set forth in the Rule to the exemption outside of the
Rule as well. On the other hand, there is the danger that in
attempting to comply with the terms of the Rule, the issuer
might prevent itself from taking advantage of the exemption
outside of the Rule. For example, under the Rule an offeree
may have access to information only as provied by the issuer,
while in the Fifth Circuit, the only way an offeree may have
access to information is by virtue of insider status. 2 '4 In this
situation, the issuer would have to decide whether to attempt
to comply with the Rule or with the exemption under existing
law. Hopefully the Commission will issue a release which clari-
fies the terms of the exemption under existing law so that is-
suers can choose intelligently among complying with the Rule,
utilizing existing law, or registering its stock.
282. Schneider & Zall, supra note 45, at F-9.
283. Id. at F-10.
284. See SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1972).
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